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Protecting secure random key from eavesdropping in quantum key distribution protocols has been
well developed. In this letter, we further study how to detect and eliminate eavesdropping on the
random base string in such protocols. The correlation between the base string and the key enables
Alice and Bob to use specific privacy amplification to distill and reuse the previously shared base
string with unconditional security and high efficiency. The analysis of the unconditional secure
reusable base string brings about new concept and protocol design technique.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum cryptography has received wide attention
from people who pursue perfectly secure communication.
Since the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
by Bennett and Brassard [1], the BB84 QKD protocol,
scientists have developed various techniques to improve
its security and efficiency. Recently, unconditional secu-
rity of BB84 QKD protocol have been achieved [2, 3, 4].
Most QKD protocols focus on detecting and eliminat-
ing eavesdropping on the random key by encoding it to
the qubits with different bases. The choices of the bases,
namely the base string likes an encryption key. Espe-
cially in some recent works, the base string are shared
before the protocol [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. So it is interesting
to investigate how to protect such encryption key from
eavesdropping.
In this Letter, we explicitly prove how much uncondi-
tional secure base string can be reused for the first time.
The result not only increases the efficiency of quantum
cryptography, but also contributes to the foundation of
quantum information science and cryptography designs.
Suppose Alice and Bob share a common and random
base string. Then Alice encodes the qubits using this
shared base string and sends them to Bob. Bob receives
and measures the qubits in the bases determined by the
shared base string. Under ideal situation, Alice and Bob
can reuse the base string if no error is found in the check
step. This kind of sharing is able to greatly increase the
efficiency of quantum key distribution, because no qubit
is wasted due to wrong choice of the measuring basis.
However, practically the channel errors are unavoid-
able. Eve may steal some information about the se-
cret base string. However, we will prove that Alice and
Bob can estimate and eliminate Eve’s information on the
base string by privacy amplification. The proof of our
QKD protocol with shared and reusable base string is
also based on the lemma [2] that high fidelity implies low
entropy and the similar reduction technique of Shor and
Preskill [4]. But we extend the security analysis from one
entangled pair to a block of two entangled pairs. This
extension gives correlation between the error rates of the
two entangled pairs.
We start with the entanglement distillation QKD pro-
tocol. Firstly, we can also suppose that the secret and
random base string is also generated from another high-
fidelity EPR pairs, denoted by the base pairs, namely,
Alice and Bob both measure their qubits of the base
pairs respectively in the Z-basis. Secondly, we let Alice
and Bob postpone the measurements on the base pairs.
Then Alice’s random Hadamard transformation on the
second qubit of each communicating pair is replaced by
the controlled-Hadamard operation with her own qubit
of one base pair as the source qubit and the second qubit
of one communicating pair as the target qubit. Particu-
larly, the control-Hadamard gate using the first qubit to
control the second qubit is denoted as CH12.
Following the ideas above, we obtain the following pro-
tocol:
Protocol 1 Entanglement distillation QKD protocol
with reusable shared base string
1. Alice and Bob share 2n base EPR pairs in the state
|Φ+〉⊗2n.
2. Alice prepares 2n communicating EPR pairs in
the state |Φ+〉⊗2n, and groups each communicat-
ing pair with one base pair to create 2n blocks.
Fig. 1 shows the operations on one block in the
protocol, in which the 1st and the 4th qubits form
a base pair and the 2nd and the 3rd qubits form a
communicating pair.
3. In each block, Alice applies CH13, as shown in
phase 1 of Fig. 1.
4. Alice sends the 3rd qubit of each block to Bob, as
shown in phase 2 of Fig. 1.
5. Bob receives the qubits. In each block, he applies
CH43, as shown in phase 3 of Fig. 1. Then he
publicly announces the reception.
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FIG. 1: Entanglement distillation QKD protocol with
reusable base string in a block of two EPR pairs
6. The following steps are post-processing procedure.
Alice and Bob randomly permute the blocks and
agree on n random blocks out of the 2n blocks as
check blocks.
7. In each check block, Alice and Bob both measure
their own qubits of the communicating pairs in Z-
basis, and publicly compare their results to obtain
the channel bit error rate e. If there are too many
errors, they abort the protocol.
8. By estimating the bit error rate on the communi-
cating pairs in the code blocks from the checking
process, Alice and Bob apply an entanglement pu-
rification protocol(EPP) to distill m communicat-
ing pairs with high fidelity from the n corrupted
communicating pairs. Then they measure them
both in Z-basis to establish an m-bit secret key.
9. Alice and Bob can also estimate the phase error
rate on the base pairs in all blocks as not greater
than 2e. Then Alice and Bob apply another EPP
to distill 2m′ base pairs with high fidelity from the
2n corrupted base pairs. Then they measure them
both in Z-basis to establish a 2m′-bit secret base
string.
The key point to prove the unconditional security of
Protocol 1 is the estimation of the error rates on the two
kinds of the EPR pairs, shown in step 8 and 9. When the
channel is noisy, we suppose without loss of generality the
errors of the channel all come from Eve’s manipulation
of the quantum system. Assuming that Eve can perform
arbitrary coherent attack on all blocks. Here we apply
quantum de Finetti representation [11], and we only con-
sider the asymptotic situation of large n. Thanks to the
random permutation of the blocks in step 6 of Protocol 1,
the 2n blocks are exchangeable and satisfy the condition
of quantum de Finetti representation. Therefore, the fi-
nal state of the total 2n blocks is a mixture of product
state, namely, the density matrix of the final state is
ρ′all =
∫
pρ′ρ
′⊗2ndρ′, (1)
in which ρ′ is chosen from any possible corrupted density
matrix of one block and pρ′ is its weight. Due to the
linear sum of different ρ′⊗2n in the final density matrix,
the results of any measurement on ρ′all are also the linear
weighted sum of measurement results on different ρ′⊗2n.
So we can restrict our analysis within one possible value
of ρ′.
Considering the case with one possible value of ρ′, we
find that the results of measuring any operator on each
block of the final state are effectively an independent and
identical distribution. The bit and phase error rates of
the base pairs, denoted as Ebitbase and E
ph
base, and the bit
and phase error rates of the communicating pairs, de-
noted as Ebitcomm and E
ph
comm, are the rates of obtaining
−1 when measuring Z1Z4, X1X4, Z2Z3 and X2X3 re-
spectively in the blocks. Because all these four measure-
ment operators are commute to each other, we are able
to apply classical probability here. By the central limit
theorem, all these error rates are equal to the expected
values of measurement results of corresponding operators
in one block, with very large probabilities. As a result,
we can only analyze the error rates of one block in one
possible state of ρ′.
When we only study one block, the initial state is ρ0
defined as
ρ0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0|, (2)
where |ψ0〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)14 ⊗ (|00〉 + |11〉)23. Any
possible final state, ρ′, is obtained by arbitrary operation
of Eve. A general operation of Eve can be described
by a superoperator on the 3rd qubit in each block [12],
which is transmitted via the channel. We denote the
superoperator as §. Then from the protocol, we obtain
that
ρ′ = CH43§(CH13ρ0CH
†
13)CH
†
43. (3)
A general superoperator of Eve’s operation is described
as
§(ρ1) =
∑
µ
Mµρ1M
†
µ, (4)
in which ρ1 = CH13ρ1CH
†
13 and Mµ is an arbitrary ma-
trix acting on the 3rd qubit, namely,
Mµ =
(
aµ11 a
µ
12
aµ21 a
µ
22
)
3
. (5)
Due to the linearity of the superoperator, we first cal-
3culate the error rates on each Mµ. The results are
Ebit,µcomm =
1
8
(|aµ11 − a
µ
22|
2 + |aµ12 − a
µ
21|
2 +
2|aµ12|
2 + 2|aµ21|
2), (6)
Eph,µcomm = E
bit,µ
comm, (7)
Ebit,µbase = 0, (8)
Eph,µbase = E
bit,µ
comm +
1
8
{[−aµ11 + a
µ
22][(a
µ
12)
∗ + (aµ21)
∗] +
[−(aµ11)
∗ + (aµ22)
∗][aµ12 + a
µ
21]} (9)
≤ 2Ebit,µcomm.. (10)
Therefore, by using the linearity of Eq. (1) and (4),
we obtain the relationship between the four kinds of error
rates, namely,
Ephcomm = E
bit
comm, (11)
Ebitbase = 0, (12)
Ephbase ≤ 2E
bit
comm. (13)
To interpret the above results, we note that the
controlled-Hadamard operations serves as the random
Hadamard operations, which make the bit and phase er-
ror rates of the communicating pairs symmetric. As no
qubit of the base pairs are transmitted through the chan-
nel, their bit error rate is 0, while their phase error rate
is the result of the propagation of errors on the commu-
nicating pairs.
Moreover, because Alice and Bob only need to know
Ebitcomm, E
bit
comm can be best estimated from the compar-
ison of the Z-basis measurement results of n check com-
municating pairs, in step 7 of Protocol 1, as well as the
channel bit error rate e. Thus knowing the bounds of
the error rates, Alice and Bob can employ two EPPs on
the communicating and base pairs respectively, shown in
step 8 and 9. If both EPP are successfully, they will
distill both high-fidelity base and communicating EPR
pairs which implies low entropy of Eve’s information [2].
Therefore, not only secret shared key is established but
also secret base string can be reused in the future, after
Z-basis measurements on these pairs. Note that no base
pairs are sacrificed in the checking process so total 2n
base pairs can be used in EPP.
So far, we have shown the unconditional security of
Protocol 1. Our final goal is to derive a prepare-and-
measure protocol with reusable shared base string from
Protocol 1. The reduction lies on the fact that some of
the final Z-basis measurements in step 8 and 9 commute
to other operations and measurements in the protocol,
and that can be brought forward to the beginning of the
protocol without affecting the security [4].
Firstly, both Alice and Bob’s final measurements on
both pairs can be brought before the error correct-
ing procedure in step 8 and 9. If we use EPP with
one-way classical communications, the result effectively
changes the EPP to error correction with Calderbank-
Shor-Steane(CSS) codes [4] on single qubits. A CSS Code
Q(C1, C2) employs two classical linear code C1 and C2,
in which C1 and C2 are used for correcting bit and phase
errors respectively and C2 ⊂ C1 [13]. Moreover, because
the bit error rate on the base pairs is always 0, we only
need C2 to correct the base pairs.
Secondly, Alice’s final measurements commute with
the controlled-Hadamard gates applied in step 3. It can
be also verified that Bob’s final measurements on the base
pairs commute to the gates in step 5.
Thirdly, no measurement of the phase error rates are
required, because we have proved that the upper bounds
of the two kinds of phase error rates can be estimated us-
ing the channel bit error rate e. Thus Alice and Bob’s fi-
nal measurements commute to the measurements in step
7.
Finally, we have successfully brought Alice’s final mea-
surements to the beginning of Protocol 1. We are also
able to bring Bob’s final measurements on the base pairs
to the beginning of the protocol, and to bring those on
the communicating pairs to Bob’s reception of the qubits.
We summarize the result of the equivalent transforma-
tions as the following protocol.
Protocol 2 BB84 QKD protocol with reusable shared
base string
1. Alice and Bob share 2n-bit binary base string b.
2. Alice prepares 2n qubits. If the corresponding bit
value of b is 0, she randomly prepares the qubit
in |0〉 or |1〉; otherwise she randomly prepares the
qubit in |+〉 or |−〉.
3. Alice sends the qubits to Bob.
4. Bob receives the qubits and immediately measure
them in certain basis according his b. Then he pub-
licly announces the reception.
5. Alice and Bob agree on n qubits as check qubits.
The rest n qubits are code qubits.
6. Alice and Bob publicly compare the bit values on
the check qubits and obtain the channel bit error
rate e. If there are too many errors, they abort the
protocol.
7. Alice and Bob select a CSS code Q(C1, C2) that are
capable of correcting both bit and phase errors on
the code qubits, which are both e. They employ C1
to correct the bit errors in the measurement results
of the code qubits. Then they use the cosset of the
corrected results to C2 as the final key.
8. Alice and Bob select another linear code C′2 that
are capable of correcting the phase errors on the
hypothetic base EPR pairs represented by b, whose
rate is at most 2e. They use the cosset of b to C′2
as final reusable secret base string.
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FIG. 2: The generation rates of final secure key(solid line)
and base string(dashed line)
Now we analyze the rates of generating random key
and reusable base string. The maximal achievable gen-
eration rate of the final secure key [4, 14] is
Rk(e) = 1−H(E
bit
comm)−H(E
ph
comm) = 1− 2H(e),(14)
in which H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). The
length of the final key is nRk. Similarly, if 2e < 0.5, the
maximal achievable generation rate of the final reusable
base string [4] is
Rb(e) = 1−H(E
bit
base)−H(E
ph
base) ≤ 1−H(2e). (15)
The length of the final reusable base string is 2nRb. We
plot these two rates on Fig. 2. We find that the maximal
error rate that gives non-zero generation rate of the base
string is 25%, much larger than that of the key of about
11%.
Suppose Alice and Bob initially share a 2n-bit base
string, they use it to encode 2n qubits in Protocol 2. Af-
ter the error correction and privacy amplification, they
get nRk(e1)-bit key and the 2nRb(e1)-bit base string re-
mains. Then they use the base string again to encode
2nRb(e1) qubits in the next protocol and obtain another
nRb(e1)Rk(e2)-bit key; the remaining base string be-
comes 2nRb(e1)Rb(e2). In this way, they repeat Protocol
2 again and again. If the channel bit error rate does not
change, the total length of key generated from the initial
2n-bit base string is
Lk = nRk(e)(1 +Rb(e) +Rb(e)
2 + · · · ) =
nRk(e)
1−Rb(e)
.
(16)
We also plot Lk/(2n) on Fig. 3 and find that if the
channel bit error rate is low enough, a small length of
initial base string can generate much longer random key.
In conclusion, we have shown that if Alice and Bob first
share a secret base string and use them in BB84 QKD
protocol to encode the qubits, they are able to reuse this
shared information in the future by the distillation of
the base string using certain privacy amplification meth-
ods. In particular, in the part of the qubits successfully
received by Bob, the generation rate of the base distil-
lation is also related to the channel bit error rate, and
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FIG. 3: Lk/(2n) verse the channel bit error rate e
higher than that of the key distillation. Furthermore, as
the bit error rate of the base string is zero, we need only
use a classical linear code instead of CSS codes to distill
the base string, so the distillation is much simpler and
more efficient. Secure reusable base string is contrasting
different, and it may lead new strategy in protocol de-
signs in quantum cryptography, hence contributes to the
foundation of quantum information science.
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